Over the past three years, the European debate on digital networks has been largely dominated by the discussion on the level playing field, namely how to balance relationships and interests between connectivity operators and large OTT platforms within the digital ecosystem, a topic that frequently ends up crystallising into telcos’ economic claims and thus into the now familiar “fair share” issue. Pressure from the main European telcos and certain positions taken by the Commission, driven by Commissioner Breton, have fuelled expectations that the reform of the EU electronic communications framework might result in a new regulatory architecture bringing online platforms (and in particular cloud providers) and telecommunications under a common umbrella. In such a context of regulatory convergence, it could finally have been possible to intervene directly in the economic relationships between Big Tech (especially those that can be classified as “large traffic generators”) and telcos, by specifically amending the rules on IP interconnection and, almost inevitably, on net neutrality. 
The Digital Networks Act (“DNA”) proposal presented in January 2026 does not follow this political trajectory, although it does not shy away from the idea of rationalising, to some extent, relationships between telcos and OTTs. The text does not introduce an explicit “fair share” contribution obligation, nor does it overturn the assumption – reiterated also by BEREC – that traffic‑exchange agreements largely continue to function on a commercial basis, without any need for ad hoc tariff regulation. At the same time, DNA’s extension of authorisation and interconnection rules to digital and Internet infrastructures and services, as well as the promotion of forms of “ecosystemic” cooperation between network operators, cloud providers and content providers, reflect a structural market change that may more subtly and indirectly redefine the perimeter of telco‑OTT relations and their supervision by regulatory authorities. 
In this contribution, I will try to show how, behind the apparent technical neutrality of the DNA proposal, lies a redefinition of the regulatory vocabulary on interconnection, net neutrality and the role of over‑the‑top infrastructures, which may profoundly affect future relationships between telcos and OTTs even in the absence of a true “fair share” regime. 

Cloud and network markets
The DNA proposal reflects an electronic communications market in transition, where telco infrastructures and those of cloud providers are increasingly intertwined in operational and commercial terms, while the term “interconnection” still requires technically rigorous use, referring to traffic exchange between electronic communications networks. However, this stage in the sector’s development does not allow us to state that telco operators and cloud service providers have become direct competitors: they are rather distinct technological and infrastructure value chains, which converge only at certain layers (for example at the level of managed services, edge and platforms), but remain separate as regards their respective “essential facilities”. In other words, a hyperscaler’s data centre, with its logic of elastic capacity and distributed computing, does not perform the same function as a telco‑controlled access or transport network, and the fact that these assets are increasingly coordinated at the level of integrated commercial offerings does not in itself entail an overlap of the relevant markets. 
Against this backdrop, the rhetoric of the “cloudification” of the telco sector risks being misleading. Many industries – from retail to banking, via media and public administration – have shifted growing portions of their IT systems and critical functions to the cloud, without for this reason being reclassified as an integral part of the cloud services market. Likewise, when a telco integrates cloud components into the very core of its infrastructure, its industrial nature does not automatically change: the case of Telefónica Deutschland, which migrated portions of its core network to an Amazon infrastructure while remaining in all respects an electronic communications operator and not a cloud service provider, is emblematic of this distinction. Convergence, in short, operates through functional coupling between technological layers, not through a merger of markets. 
At the same time, precisely because value chains are becoming more hybrid, public authorities increasingly need a pragmatically holistic approach to the sector whenever cross‑cutting public interests are at stake – such as network and service security, critical infrastructure resilience, the fight against illegal content, the protection of fundamental rights and technological sovereignty. State jurisdiction over such interests cannot be artificially fragmented depending on whether the infrastructures under supervision are classified as electronic communications networks (public or otherwise) or as networks connecting storage and processing facilities; however, the tools for intervention and remedies may differ, for obvious technological and enforcement reasons. It is in these terms that one can perhaps read the potential evolution of the DNA’s provisions on general authorisations and interconnection: rather than postulating competitive homogenisation between telcos and cloud providers, the proposal seems geared towards bringing all strategic digital infrastructures back into the same “regulatory fold”, while maintaining that responsibilities, obligations and supervisory perimeters will have to remain calibrated to the specific functions performed at the different layers. 

The evolution of the European IP interconnection market
The technical and commercial evolution of IP interconnection makes it increasingly clear why the European framework cannot remain anchored to a “historic” snapshot of transit and peering markets, though this does not justify a leap towards intrusive or “sender pays”‑type regulatory models. If traffic tends to concentrate in a few large generators, interconnection strategies become more selective, and solutions such as PNIs, in‑network caching and edge architectures structurally complement traditional public peering (normally managed at IXPs), then the law must also shift from a logic focused solely on relationships between traditional network operators to an ecosystem‑based vision, taking into account interdependencies between access, transit, content platforms and cloud infrastructures. 
These changes do not amount to a “failure” of the interconnection market (BEREC’s analyses continue to see overall competitive dynamics and prices under technological pressure), but they do increase the risk that localised disputes between CAPs and access providers may produce visible effects on perceived quality and security, especially when they involve highly concentrated interface points. Hence the need, already foreshadowed in the 2018 European Code and in NRA case‑law, to strengthen monitoring tools, clarify the relationship between the interconnection framework and open Internet regulation, and streamline ex post intervention powers where there are unjustified refusals or exploitation of bargaining power in capacity negotiations. 
In this sense, the desirable evolution of the European interconnection regime is not the one politically evoked in the “fair share” debate, which would use interconnection as a channel for redistributing investment costs ex lege between telcos and OTTs. Rather, the aim is to update the framework in order to reflect the current complexity of the IP‑IC ecosystem, maintaining the principle of free commercial interconnection while equipping authorities with clearer tools to intervene, on a case‑by‑case basis, when traffic concentration or the critical nature of certain nodes risks undermining the end‑to‑end connectivity that European regulation is tasked with preserving. 

The new European interconnection regime: much ado about nothing?
It is therefore not surprising that the DNA proposal introduces significant, though not radical, developments on interconnection. On the one hand, the interconnection market is extended in a broad sense, so as to encompass networks and infrastructures other than public telecommunications networks (private or atypical). This broadening can be inferred from the generic description of interconnection matters in Article 65 DNA, but even more from the streamlined definition (Article 2(29) DNA), where the term “public” disappears in relation to the networks to be interconnected). This choice marks the DNA’s tendency to move beyond some of the distinctions of the current framework (public vs non‑public) and to embed interconnection into a broader notion of a “digital networks ecosystem”, without changing the economic‑legal function of the definition (a specific type of access, via a physical/logical link, enabling communications between users or access to services). 
On the other hand, however, the DNA reiterates that interconnection rights and obligations relate to public electronic communications networks, namely those that control connectivity to end‑users (Article 66 and Recital 164 DNA), and that the interconnection obligation is aimed at the provision of public electronic communications services. 
The DNA system therefore does not significantly depart from the structure of the 2018 Code: there is a generic interconnection regime as the default model, based on negotiated commercial agreements (right to interconnect); and there is a specific regime for public networks, with targeted interconnection obligations justified by the need for network effects, end‑to‑end connectivity and the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks. 
The most significant change therefore concerns the extension of the basic interconnection regime, which can now clearly cover a broad range of infrastructures suited to the transmission of electronic signals. Some OTTs and hyperscalers may see this overall development as detrimental to their interests, fearing that a broader scope of application of the rules would lead regulators to impose interconnection obligations on their infrastructures, however defined, thereby opening the door to settlement procedures that pave the way for fair share. However, I would currently rule out such an interpretation, precisely because the strictly regulated field is limited to public electronic communications networks and not to others. 
Even more significant is Recital 168 DNA, which states that national rules laying down interconnection conditions on the basis of a particular level of investment by the requesting party, rather than on the characteristics of the access or interconnection services provided, may cause market distortions and therefore may not be compatible with competition rules. This recital, which appears to be a novelty compared to the 2018 Code, seems to have an explicitly anti‑fair‑share function: it sets a clear limit on the possibility that, at national level, interconnection conditions might be made dependent on the “degree of investment” of the other party, rather than on the nature of the access/interconnection services covered by the agreement. In substance, the text tells Member States that they cannot introduce legal or administrative measures allowing different interconnection treatment of a player merely because it does not invest (or invests less) in network infrastructures, if the requested interconnection service is the same. The paradigmatic example is precisely the idea of charging large OTTs different access or interconnection conditions because they “have not invested” in access or backhauling networks like telcos, rather than on the technical and economic characteristics of the interconnection service provided. Recital 168 points out that such national measures risk distorting the market and being incompatible with competition rules, because they shift the focus from the price/consideration for a specific service to the “industrial profile” of the requester (how much it invests, in what type of asset, with which business model). 
In any case, the extension of the scope of generic interconnection is not entirely neutral. Together with the new authorisation regime (see infra), it opens the door to a general and broader supervisory power of regulatory authorities over atypical infrastructures, not to impose the feared regulated‑tariff interconnection obligations (a scenario opposed by OTTs, as noted), but to allow the protection of cross‑border public interests, such as security and resilience, quality of service and consumer protection, the fight against illegal content, and so on. Let us imagine that a major player, OTT or telco, decides to configure its peering infrastructure in a way that significantly affects the network architectures of other national operators. Could the regulator intervene (possibly in parallel either with the competition authority or the conciliation procedure below) if it considered that such conduct might harm interests protected by the DNA or by EU law?

Cooperation in the ecosystem and the conciliation procedure
As a “legacy” of three exhausting years of debate on who should finance new fibre and 5G networks, the DNA proposal introduces mechanisms to facilitate commercial and technical cooperation between ecosystem players, with the adoption of guidelines by BEREC (Article 191 DNA) and the possible use of voluntary conciliation procedures, with BEREC and national regulators acting as neutral facilitators (Article 192 DNA). 
This innovation is causing considerable unease among some OTTs, which fear such soft‑law mechanisms and voluntary conciliation as a kind of Trojan horse for fair share that, once thrown out of the front door in the interconnection field, might re‑enter through the back door in other ways. On the other hand, the aforementioned Recital 164 DNA also notes that “traffic may give rise to disproportionate or unsustainable investment needs for the receiving providers of public electronic communications networks”. This is one of the classic casus belli raised by telcos against OTTs when the latter invoke free settlement in peering relations (from the older Cogent/Orange case to the more recent Meta/Deutsche Telekom dispute). 
However, the revival of fair share is ruled out by Recital 404 DNA, whose wording can be read as a rather clear safeguard against turning ordinary OTT–telco commercial disagreements into regulated disputes that could be used, de facto, as a lever to introduce fair share through case‑law or para‑regulatory means. By clarifying that the “matters addressed in those guidelines”, including issues relating to interconnection between public electronic communications networks and networks of other players, “should not be subject to dispute resolution” and that the dispute resolution mechanism “should be limited to the enforcement of obligations laid down in this Regulation”, Recital 404 prevents national authorities from being called upon to rule on the economic terms of cooperative or voluntary interconnection agreements. In other words, it excludes the possibility that mere disagreement on the price or commercial conditions of a PNI, a caching agreement or a traffic‑management scheme between a telco and an OTT could be brought before the regulator as though it concerned the application of a regulatory obligation, thereby opening the door to surreptitious forms of ex lege price‑setting in favour of network operators. 
The EU legislature thus appears to distinguish between two levels: on the one hand, the enforcement of the specific obligations laid down by the DNA on interconnection between public networks; on the other, cooperation or voluntary agreements – a category that typically includes many interconnection solutions between telco networks and infrastructures of “non‑telco” players (OTT, cloud, CAP), including the traffic‑optimisation mechanisms referred to in the proposal. This approach seems consistent with the DNA’s fundamental choice to maintain the logic of free commercial interconnection – while introducing ecosystem cooperation tools and guidelines on traffic efficiency – and not to turn the dispute resolution mechanism into a general forum for redesigning the bargaining balance between large traffic generators and telcos. 

General authorisations: towards a new regime?
The DNA proposal provides that general authorisations for telcos are required not only for electronic communications operators in the strict sense, but also for infrastructures providing Internet services (“information society services”: Article 9(2) DNA). Recital 42 refers, even more generally, to digital services. This innovation could mean that cloud providers, including CDNs, would also have to seek authorisation and be subject to the supervision of certain authorities. 
Under the 2018 Code, the definition and regime of “general authorisation” are clearly constructed only around electronic communications networks and services: the general authorisation is defined as the legal framework ensuring rights for the “provision of electronic communications networks or services”, and Articles 12–13 of the 2018 Code systematically link the general authorisation to “electronic communications networks or services”, expressly excluding non‑number‑based interpersonal communications services. In other words, the 2018 Code does not provide for a general authorisation obligation for information society services as such, which remain regulated on other legal bases (e.g. the DSA) and are not subject to the telco authorisation title. 
In the DNA proposal, by contrast, the political construction is that of a single framework for “digital infrastructures”, in which general authorisation is presented as a key element of the single market for connectivity and related infrastructures. The system remains centred on providers of electronic communications networks and services, but the DNA introduces a framework of cooperation and obligations that explicitly involves providers of “information society services” and other “digital services” (e.g. in provisions on the IP interconnection ecosystem, cooperation between telcos and OTTs, “innovative” net neutrality, etc.), without turning them all into entities required to notify under the general authorisation regime. 
This leads to the impression – which some observers share – of a semantic and regulatory “slippage”: the recitals and overall terminology of the DNA refer to “digital services” and, in some provisions, identify information society service providers as structural stakeholders in the connectivity framework, whereas the 2018 Code kept the telco authorisation perimeter much more clearly separate from the rest of the digital ecosystem. 
The increased powers of the authorities arising from the new general authorisation regime add to the already‑mentioned extension of the scope of interconnection rules. In other words, the DNA tends to “push” telco authorities towards a broader supervisory role over the digital infrastructure ecosystem, without (at least for now) turning them into general regulators of “everything digital”. 

Conclusions
The Digital Networks Act proposal does not follow the political trajectory that some major telcos had envisioned in recent years, namely that of regulatory convergence leading to OTT platforms and telcos being brought within a single market, with a fair share obligation for certain large traffic generators. Convergence is understood as functional convergence between layers, not as a merger of markets or as regulatory homogenisation of hyperscalers with network operators. 
This does not mean, however, that the DNA is “neutral” with regard to telco‑OTT relations. The proposal reflects a market in which telco networks, CDNs, cloud and edge infrastructures are increasingly intertwined, and therefore shifts the focus from a “historic” snapshot of IP interconnection to a more “ecosystemic” vision, in which traffic concentration, critical nodes and impacts on perceived quality and resilience also matter. In this sense, the regulatory goal is not redistributive (to make certain OTTs pay ex lege), but rather to preserve end‑to‑end connectivity and manage the risks linked to bottlenecks and localised disputes. 
The extension of the notion of interconnection and of the infrastructural perimeter broadens the authorities’ jurisdiction over strategic digital infrastructures, but regulated obligations remain centred on public electronic communications networks. Overall, the DNA shifts the balance more towards ecosystem‑level supervision and the security and resilience of digital infrastructures than towards a regulatory redistribution of costs between telcos and large OTTs.